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THE INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION ACT
OF 1983: A FIRST STEP TOWARD RESPONSIBLE
FOREIGN LENDING
Recent events in international finance' have attracted the attention of
economic experts and the public to the precarious financial situation of Less
Developed Countries ("LDCs") 2 and their commercial bank creditors.3 The
bank industry practice of petro-dollar recycling4 in the last decade contributed
to the creation of enormous LDC debt obligations to foreign lenders. 5 As a
consequence, commercial banks that are heavily involved in foreign lending
face a substantial risk of failure should debtor nations default on their
1. See Bogdanowicz-Bindert, Debt: Beyond the Quick Fix, TmUD WoRLD Q., Oct. 1983,
at 828-29. In 1982, the International Monetary Fund organized a multi-billion dollar rescue
package of bank debt rescheduling, new bank loans, and bridge financings in response to
Mexico's claim that it could not meet its outstanding debt obligations or pursue its economic
recovery plan without credit assistance. Id. at 829-30. Argentina and Brazil subsequently
arranged for similar rescue packages. Id. at 830.
2. For the purposes of this article, Less Developed Countries (LDCs) include countries
of the Third World and Eastern Europe which have borrowed substantial sums from Western
commercial banks. References in this article to debt owed by LDCs include debt obligations of
both the LDC government and its instrumentalities, as well as those of private borrowers within
the LDC.
3. See Rohatyn, The State of the Banks, N.Y. Rnv. Boons, Nov. 4, 1982, at 3 (policy
is needed to cope with LDC debt situation in light of serious risk of c~lapse of world financial
system); see also The Debt-Bomb Threat, Tnmm, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42 (possibility of large-scale
defaults on LDC debt exists) [hereinafter cited as Debt-Bomb Threat].
4. See Rohatyn, supra note 3, at 3 (commentators identify petro-dollar recycling as
major cause of current world debt crisis). Following the oil price increases by the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") in 1973 and 1979, OPEC nations deposited
surplus cash generated by these price increases in Western commercial banks. Id. As a result of
the OPEC price increases, LDCs faced significantly higher energy costs at a time when the
LDCs sought to industrialize rapidly to meet the economic needs of their growing populations.
See S. REP. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
Western banks in turn lent a large share of the OPEC funds to LDC countries, some of which
the LDCs used to pay for expensive imported oil. Rohatyn, supra note 3, at 3.
Commentators on the world debt situation have attributed the current debt crisis to
factors in addition to the OPEC oil price increases. Id. These factors include the recent U.S.
economic deflation, causing lower world raw materials prices from which LDCs derive the bulk
of their foreign exchange earnings; the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of managed
foreign currency exchange ratios, causing general uncertainty in currency exchange markets and
adding to the foreign exchange problems of LDCs; and, in the case of Eastern Europe, the
breakdown of the U.S./Soviet detente process, souring relations between Eastern European
debtor nations and their Western bank creditors. Id.
5. See Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 3, at 42 (banks, governments and international
institutions had foreign loans of $706 billion outstanding at mid-1982); see also Gruth,
International Debt-Crisis: The Next Phase, BANrKER, July 1983, at 25 (according to Bank of
International Settlements, international banks had total debt exposure of $240 billion in problem
countries by mid-1982).
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foreign loans. 6 The stability of the debt situation continues to deteriorate as
LDC borrowers seek additional capital to help service their existing loans at
the very time that commercial banks, fearing increased loan loss exposure,
are becoming reluctant to lend to LDCs.
7
The threat of domestic bank failures from possible defaults by LDCs on
their commercial debt prompted the United States Congress to enact legis-
lation designed to promote sound banking practices among the principal
United States lenders to LDCs, the United States multinational banks.8 The
International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (the "Act") 9 requires federal
banking regulatory agencies 0 to take measures to ensure greater stability of
6. See Debt-Bomb Threat, supra note 3, at 50 (real *possibility exists that LDCs win
default on their foreign debt); see also Rohatyn, shpra note 3, at 6 (radical political change in
LDC could cause LDC to default on or repudiate foreign debt despite likelihood of resulting
alienation from world financial markets). But see Wriston, Banking Against Disaster, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1982, atA27, col. 1 (few examples in history exist of countries defaulting on
their debt); see also International Finance: An Interview with Walter B. Wriston, 8 FLrTcHER
F. 249, 252 (1984) (default is not realistic option for debtor nations because defaulting nations
would no longer have access to capital markets) [hereinafter cited as Wriston Interview].
7. See Special Feature, U.S. Regulation of Bank Lending to LDCs: Balancing Bank
Overexposure and Credit Undersupply, 8 YALE J. WoRLD Pua. ORD. 200, 200 (1982) (number
of banks willing to lend to LDCs and new credit available to LDCs are decreasing) [hereinafter
cited as Regulation of Bank Lending]; see also Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 1, at 828-29
(banks lending to LDCs were more interested in protecting their assets by removing them from
LDCs than in assuring long-term interests of debtors and fellow creditors).
Decreasing world oil prices and increasing world economic growth may mitigate in part
the stifling effect that bank unwillingness to lend has on LDC growth. Cf. The IMF Toasts the
World's Recovery, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 1984, at 69 (IMF raises estimate of expansion in world
trade from 5.5% to 8.5% for 1984). Although the economic forecasts are reassuring, the threat
of LDC default on foreign loans persists considering the lack of significant increase in the
export activity of LDCs. Id. at 70.
8. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§3901-12 (West Supp. 1984) (International Lending Supervision Act
of 1983 (the "Act")).
According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, as of June, 1983, the 17 U.S. multinational bank holding
companies included: BankAmerica Corporation; Bank of Boston Corporation; Bankers Trust
New York Corporation; Chase Manhattan Corporation; Chemical New York Corporation;
Citicorp; Continental Illinois Corporation; Crocker National Corporation; First-Chicago Cor-
poration; First Interstate Bancorp; Irving Bank Corporation; Mandfacturers Hanover Corpo-
ration; Marine Midland Banks, Inc.; Mellon National Corporaton; J.P. Morgan & Co.,
Incorporated; Security Pacific Corporation;, and Wells Fargo & Company. See News Release,'
Federal Reserve Board, June 13, 1983, reprinted in 12 hTrr'L LEGAL MARnALs 930, 931 n.1
(1983). In a Senate report, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
stated that LDC borrowers owed U.S. banks about $100 billion. SENAim REPoRT, supra note 4,
at 5. The report also indicated that LDC loans by the nine largest U.S. banks represented 200
percent of the capital of the nine banks at mid-1982. Id. A 200 percent ratio of LDC loans to
equity means that if LDC borrowers do not repay even half of these loans, the equity investment
of the nine banks' shareholders would be destroyed and the banks surely would fail. See Top
Banks' Third World Loans Detailed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1983, at D3, col. 1.
9. 12 U.S.C.A. §§3901-12 (West Supp. 1984).
10. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (listing federal banking agencies and
describing functions of each agency).
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the domestic banking system by imposing restrictions on the foreign lending
practices of domestic banks. The Act seeks to improve the financial position
of banks with significant exposure to potential LDC default by strengthening
bank balance sheets," removing income accounting incentives for banks to
engage in unhealthy lending practices, 2 and requiring detailed reporting and
disclosure of the foreign loan portion of a bank's asset portfolio.'
3
The Act delegates to the three principal bank regulatory agencies of the
federal government-the Federal Reserve Board (the "Fed"), the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (the "COC"), and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (the "FDIC")' 4-the authority to establish minimum financial
standards for domestic banks involved in lending abroad. The Act mandates
that banks with particularly high levels of LDC default exposure establish
special reserves against potential losses from foreign loans.' 6 Although Con-
gress left the federal banking agencies to set appropriate reserve require-
ments, 7 Congress specified the accounting treatment for such special reserves. 8
Banks are to charge special reserves against their current income, and are
not to include such reserves as part of capital or as part of normal loan loss
reserves. 9
11. 12 U.S.C.A. §§3904, 3907 (West Supp. 1984).
12. Id. § 3905 (West Supp. 1984).
13. Id. §§ 3906, 3908 (West Supp. 1984).
14. See American Bank Regulation: Different Order, Same Chaos, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4,
1984, at 77-78. Under the Current regulatory framework, the Federal Reserve Board (the "Fed")
supervises the more than 5,000 bank holding companies in the U.S. Id. at 78. The Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (the "COC") regulates nationally chartered banks. Id. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC") insures bank deposits and regulates banks
which are not members of the Federal Reserve system by setting standards which banks must
meet to qualify for deposit insurance. Id. A vice presidential task force has reviewed the
regulation of U.S. banking and has proposed reforms for the consideration of Congress. Id. at
77-78. See generally C. GoLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BAmN-IN 1983-84
(1983) (historical account of development of bank regulatory system, including responsibilities
of each federal banking agency) [hereinafter cited as GoLEMME].
15. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3904, 3907 (West Supp. 1984) (three federal banking agencies
have authority under Act to establish financial standards concerning bank loan loss reserve
requirements and capital adequacy ratios).
16. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904 (West Supp. 1984). Under the Act, the federal banking agencies
are to assess the quality of banking institutions' international loans when determining whether
a special loan loss reserve is necessary. Id. § 3904(a)(1)(A).
17. Id. § 3904(c).
18. Id. § 3904(a)(2).
19. Id. Normal loan loss reserves, or allowances for possible loan losses, include reserves
which banks maintain for regulatory, supervisory, or disclosure purposes. Id. The Act created
a new type of loan loss reserve in addition to those which the federal banking agencies already
required of domestic banks. Id. Allocations for the new reserves under the Act will not help
satisfy existing reserve requirements. Id. It is not clear, however, whether the amounts banks
must hold in the new, separate reserve are fungible with normal reserve funds in covering loan
losses not associated with foreign lending, or whether banks can use normal loan loss reserves
to cover international loan losses. A reasonable assumption is that the reserves are fungible
since the Act limits the use of the new reserves only for regulatory, supervisory, or disclosure
purposes. See id.
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In determining whether to impose the special reserve requirement upon
a bank, the federal banking agencies must assess the quality of the particular
bank's loans to private and public sector borrowers in debtor nations.20 The
federal banking agencies are to consider each debtor country's history of
foreign debt service problems among private and public borrowers when
reviewing the quality of a bank's foreign loan portfolio.2' In the event that
a debtor country borrower has failed to meet its repayment schedule on a
loan, the banking agencies are to assess the likelihood that the debtor country
borrower will resume normal debt service. 22 If a domestic bank has loaned
funds within a particular debtor nation, a failure by borrowers in that nation
to meet interest payments on any external debt, to comply with any debt
rescheduling program, or to abide by an International Monetary Fund
("IMF") stabilization program would indicate a weakness in the domestic
bank's foreign loan portfolio and could trigger special reserve requirements.
23
In addition to requiring the establishment of special loan loss reserves,
the Act calls on the federal banking agencies to set minimum capital adequacy
standards for all banks covered by the Act. 24 The Act, however, affords the
agencies discretion in setting specific capital adequacy standards and in
deviating from these standards in particular situations. 25 Moreover, the Act
recognizes the agencies' pre-Act discretionary authority to declare a bank's
failure to meet or maintain the required capital standard an unsound practice
and to issue a cease and desist order requiring bank compliance with agency
20. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904(a)(1); see infra text accompanying note 23 (tests federal banking
agencies are to apply in assessing quality of foreign loans).
21. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904(a)(1). Under the Act, the federal banking agencies essentially are
to examine the creditworthiness of foreign borrowers. See id.
22. Id.; see infra note 23 and accompanying text (tests for determining quality of foreign
loans).
23. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904(a)(1).
24. See GOLEMmE, supra note 14, at 95-98. The Fed, the COC, and the FDIC establish
capital adequacy standards for banks in terms of mandatory minimum capital-to-assets ratios.
Id. at 96. Historically, capital adequacy ratios for banks differed depending on whether the
bank qualified as a multinational organization, a regional organization having total assets in
excess of $1 billion, or a community organization having total assets below $1 billion. Id. at
97. For example, as of July 1983,*the Fed and the COC considered multinational and regional
banks with total capital to total assets ratios below 6.5% as presumptively undercapitalized,
whereas the minimum ratio for community banks was 7.0%. Id.; see infra note 25 (discussing
Congressional intent to require federal banking agencies to set more stringent and uniform
capital adequacy standards for all domestic banks).
25. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3907 (West supp. 1984). While the federal banking agencies
established capital requirements for banks prior to the Act, the agencies typically considered
the large multinational banks on a case-by-case basis, and usually required lower capital-to-
assets ratios for the multinationals than for smaller regional and local banks. See H.R. RP.
No. 175, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 45, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 1898, 1928
[hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]; supra note 24 (discussing federal banking agencies'
historical approach to capital adequacy standards). The agencies justified special treatment for
the large multinational banks on the ground that greater diversification of assets made the
multinationals less vulnerable to default by any one borrower. See HousE REPORT, supra, at
[Vol. 42:193
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regulations. 26 The Act further permits a banking agency to issue a directive
to noncomplying banks requiring that these banks follow a plan designed to
achieve safe capital adequacy ratios. 27 Finally, the Act affords the banking
1928. The multinationals, however, generally have become more vulnerable to default by
borrowers within a foreign country because of the high concentration of loans the multinations
have made within particular countries, such as Mexico and Argentina. See id. (assumption that
multinational banks are more protected from default exposure than smaller banks is false in
light of recent events in international finance). Congress, therefore, rejected special treatment
for the multinational banks and sought greater uniformity and objectivity in the agencies'
approach to bank evaluations for reasons of equity and fairness among domestic banks and for
the purpose of strengthening the banking system. See id. at 1928-29.
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress would permit the agencies to
consider risk diversification, asset quality, liability composition, and other similar factors in
determining the adequacy of capital ratios for particular banks. See SENATE REPORT, supra note
4, at 16 (explaining that agencies need not set uniform capital ratio for all banks). The mere
size of the bank no longer determines capital adequacy requirements, and the agencies must
implement a similar regulatory approach toward all domestic banks. See HousE REPORT, supra,
at 1929 (Paul Volcker, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board, agreed that minimum capital
standards should apply to all types of banks).
The Senate Committee noted that the capital adequacy provisions of the Act essentially
restated existing agency authority to set capital ratios and require bank compliance. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 16 (clarification of agency authority necessary given recent Fifth
Circuit decision); see First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674
(5th Cir. 1983) (setting aside Comptroller's judgment of capital adequacy). The express language
of the Act, however, does not indicate what capital adequacy ratios banks must maintain, nor
does the Act itself state that the banking agencies are to increase capital adequacy ratios from
pre-Act levels even though such an increase clearly was Congress's goal. See 12 U.S.C.A. §
3907 (West Supp. 1984) (setting forth capital adequacy provisions); see also HousE REPORT,
supra, at 1929.
26. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3907(b)(1) (West Supp. 1984). Even before the passage of the Act, if
a federal banking agency deemed a bank's failure to maintain adequate capital ratios an "unsafe
and unsound practice," that agency could bring a cease-and-desist proceeding under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b) against the bank violating the regulation. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1982). If the agency
determined in an administrative hearing that the bank was in violation of capital adequacy
regulations, the agency could issue a cease-and-desist order requiring the bank to meet the
regulations. See GOLEMBE, supra note 14, at 106 (discussing cease-and-desist procedure). Possible
sanctions for a bank's failure to comply with a cease-and-desist order include civil money
penalties, suspension and removal of bank officers and directors, and outright revocation of
the bank's charter. Id. at 106-09. In 1982, the federal banking agencies issued 82 final cease-
and-desist orders, assessed 45 civil money penalties, and affected 4 removals of bank officers.
Id. at 108. In the vast majority of cases, however, the agencies enforce regulations through less
formal devices. Id. at 109. For example, an agency often will make approval for a bank to
engage in a new banking activity contingent upon correction of a regulatory violation. Id. Banks
may obtain judicial review of banking agency actions in a federal court of appeals. Id. at 106.
27. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3907(b)(2) (West Supp. 1984) (provision of Act permitting banking
agencies to issue directives to banks). The federal banking agencies are not limited to the cease-
and-desist procedure as a means of enforcing the Act's capital adequacy requirements. The
agencies also may issue a directive to non-complying banks requiring the banks to submit a
plan for compliance acceptable to the agencies. Id. The agencies have the power to enforce a
bank's adherence to an agency approved plan for compliance. Id. The Act, therefore, contem-
plates a more interactive procedure between the federal banking agencies and the banks in
meeting agency capital requirements than previously available under the traditional cease-and-
desist approach.
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agencies broad discretion to permit an under-captialized bank to deviate
from its recapitalization plan,2 particularly in light of the bank's progress
in achieving the desired capitalization levels.29
In addition to focusing on balance sheet tests of bank vitality, the Act
seeks to reform bank income accounting practices which in the past have
encouraged aggressive lending policies toward LDC borrowers.30 Bank man-
agement, eager to report increasing profits to shareholders, usually charges
substantial up-front fees3' for restructuring or rescheduling a foreign borrow-
er's existing debt or for granting new loans to such borrowers.3 2 Prior to the
Act, a bank could include in its reports to shareholders up-front fees collected
during a particular quarter as part of earnings for that quarter.33 The Act,
however, requires banks to amortize over the effective life of a loan all fees
above administrative costs for debt restructurings and loan originations,
thereby treating extraordinary fees as interest income to the banks. 34 Amor-
tizing such fees over a longer period of time tends to remove some of the
28. See id. § 3907(b)(2)(B)(i). A recapitalization plan should specify the means and the
timing by which an undercapitalized bank is to meet mandatory capital levels. Id. Presumably,
a deviation from a recapitalization plan could involve either the means or the deadline aspects
of the recapitalization plan.
29. Id. § 3907(b)(3). Since the Act allows deviations from capitalization plans only where
progress in achieving mandatory capitalization levels is shown, a mere good faith effort on the
part of a bank to meet the capital requirements likely will not suffice for the agencies to grant
permission for deviation from the recapitali~ation plan. Cf. id. (federal banking agencies must
assess bank's progress in meeting recapitalization plan before allowing bank to deviate from
plan).
30. See id. § 3905(a)(1) (setting forth fee accounting provisions for foreign loans).
31. See Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems: Hearings on S. 502 Before
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing]. Up-front fees are flat charges banks impose on borrowers
in addition to interest charges on the loan. See Mendez, Recent Trends in Commercial Bank
Lending to LDCs: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 8 YALE J. WoRLw PuB. OwR.
173, 186 (1982). Up-front fees include commitment, management, and agent fees. Id. Banks
typically charge such fees whenever a loan is rolled over (renewed) or refinanced. Id. Banks
charge annual commitment fees for agreeing to provide funds in the future upon given terms.
See Senate Hearing, supra, at 52. Management fees are front-end fees which banks charge as
compensation for the banks' participation in the lending transaction. Id. at 51. Management
fees generally become payable at the signing or disbursement dates of the loan. Id. Agent fees
compensate banks for out-of-pocket expenses arising from the execution of administrative duties
concerning a loan. Id. at 52.
32. See Mendez, supra note 31, at 186. In addition to providing short-term profits for
banks engaged in LDC lending, high up-front fees allow banks to decrease their overall risk in
LDC lending since banks are able to collect up-front fees early in the life of the loan. Id.
33. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 60 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, that no specified way existed prior to Act in
which to recognize banking fees as income for accounting and regulatory purposes).
34. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3905(a)(1) (West Supp. 1984). Requiring banks to spread fees over
the effective life of a loan creates the problem of interpreting what constitutes the life of the
loan for accounting and reporting purposes. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 93 (questions
from Senator John Heinz to C. Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency, indicating concern
over how federal banking agencies are to determine effective life of loan). Measuring the life
[Vol. 42:193
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competitive pressure which otherwise encourages banks to restructure contin-
uously loan agreements with LDC borrowers or enter into new loan agree-
ments with debtor nations. 35 Congress delegated rule-making authority to the
federal banking agencies and empowered the agencies to issue orders com-
pelling banks to comply with the new accounting procedures under the Act. 6
Finally, various provisions of the Act call for gathering information,
issuing reports and evaluations, 37 and disclosing publicly foreign lending
activities. 38 To assess whether banks are complying with the capital adequacy
and special reserve regulations under the Act, banks must report at least
four times each year to the banking agencies on their foreign debt exposure.
39
Moreover, banks must make information concerning material foreign lending
available to the public.40 The Act further requires domestic banks to prepare
feasibility evaluations whenever the banks propose to lend in excess of 20
million dollars to finance any foreign project involving the extraction or
processing of metals and minerals, or the manufacturing of goods. 4 1
of a loan may be particularly difficult in the case of short-term loans that banks roll over
indefinitely. Id. The banking agencies may have to resort to an examination of the intent of a
lender and a borrower as to the expected life of a loan in roll-over cases to determine the
appropriate amortization period for up-front fees. Id. at 93-94. In addition, banking agency
officials may have to resort to asking a bank how long the bank intends a particular international
loan with a roll-over provision to remain outstanding. See id. at 94. Senator Heinz expressed
concern that banks might be able to circumvent fee-spreading requirements since banking
agencies ultimately must rely on bank officers' statements regarding the intended life of a loan.
Id. Furthermore, some banks conceivably will overstate the administrative costs of foreign
lending in order to boost short term profits.
35. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 65 (statement of William M. Isaac, Chairman
of FDIC, that front-end fee-spreading would tend to remove banks' short-term profit incentive
to originate or reschedule international loans).
36. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3905(a)(2)(A), (b)(3) (West Supp. 1984).
37. See id. § 3906(a) (authorizing banking agencies to promulgate bank reporting regula-
tions).
38. See id. § 3906(b). Under the Act, the banking agencies are to promulgate regulations
requiring banks to disclose to the public information regarding "material foreign country
exposure" as measured against assets and against capital. Id. The Act left the agencies to
determine what constitutes "material exposure." See id.
39. See id. § 3906(a) (banks are to report to banking agencies at least four times each
calendar year).
40. See id. § 3906(a). Alerting bank holding company shareholders, or potential share-
holders, and bank depositors to the foreign loan exposure positions of banks would tend to
promote sound lending strategies among the banks through market discipline. See Senate
Hearing, supra note 31, at 65 (statement of William M. Isaac, Chairman of FDIC). Bank
regulators traditionally have avoided a market discipline approach to bank regulation, fearing
that public disclosure of problem loan portfolios might lead to runs on bank deposits. See
Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 222 (public disclosure of bank's foreign loan
exposure may conflict with goal of maintaining public's confidence in banking institutions).
Bankers have argued that the public may misinterpret information concerning bank loan
exposure abroad. See Kinkead, Banks Tell (Not Quite) All About Foreign Loans, FoRTuNE,
Nov. 29, 1982, at 75 (bankers maintain that public is likely to misinterpret foreign loan data).
41. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3908 (West Supp. 1984). Banks must prepare a feasibility study
whenever aggregate lending by domestic banking institutions for a single project abroad exceeds
the Act's $20 million limit. Id. the feasibility study must evaluate the likelihood of success of
1985]
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Although the Act addresses only international lending supervision, Con-
gress linked discussion of foreign lending supervision legislation with debate
over companion legislation increasing the United States' contribution to the
IMF. 42 The IMF historically has acted as a lender to countries facing
temporary balance of payment problems. 43 In recent years, however, the IMF
arguably has taken on more of the role of a bank in financing arrangements
with LDCs." LDCs therefore have come to rely increasingly on both com-
mercial bank and IMF credit to cope with ongoing balance of payment
difficulties.
45
the project and must consider the impact the project will have on the world markets for goods
of the type the planned facility is to produce. Id. The study also must consider the effect the
project is likely to have on the economy of the country in which the facility will be located. Id.
The federal banking agencies are to review such evaluations when making their normal bank
examinations and, apparently, may take the evaluations into account when assessing the health
of a bank's loan portfolio. See id. § 3908(b). A regulatory agency may bring a cease-and-desist
action against banks operating in violation of the feasibility study requirement. Id. § 3908(c)(1).
Although the legislative history of the Act does not set out Congress' reasons for requiring such
studies, it appears that Congress wants bank loan officers to divulge to the banking agencies
the sort of analysis bank officers normally should carry out within the bank where a foreign
project financing is involved.
In addition to the disclosure and reporting requirements which domestic banks must
satisfy, the Act requires the federal banking agencies to report to Congress within six months
after the enactment of the Act on progress achieved in meeting capital adequacy standards and
on the international banking supervisory practices of other developed countries. Id. § 3912.
Furthermore, the Act authorizes the General Accounting Office to audit the federal banking
agencies' regulation, supervision, and examination activities. Id. § 3910.
42. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 286 (West Supp. 1984). The November 13, 1983 amendments to §
286 provide for, among other things, an increase in the amount the United States Governor of
the IMF may contribute to the fund on behalf of the U.S. Id. § 286e-li. The contribution, or
"quota," of an IMF member country to the IMF determines the member's voting power within
the IMF. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. Member countries must review their quota at
least once every five years. Id. The most recent U.S. increase in its IMF quota prior to the
November 1983 increase occurred in 1980. Id.
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs discussed in its report
the original Senate Bill calling for increased supervision of U.S. bank foreign lending and the
Senate Bill calling for an increase in the IMF contribution. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4,
at I ("Bretton Woods Agreement Act Amendments and International Lending Supervision").
Similarly, the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs addressed the IMF
contribution and bank supervision issues in a single House report. See HousE REPORT, supra
note 25, at 1906, 1913 (Title III of House Report entitled "International Monetary Fund" and
Title IV of House Report entitled "International Lending Supervision").
43. See F. Kmois, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN Tanni LEGAL SETrINo 103 (1977)
(IMF provides members with funds to meet temporary balance of payments problems); see also
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (IMF helps finance temporary payment imbalances of
member nations).
44. Cf. supra note I (describing IMF organized rescue packages for LDC debtors). The
IMF has had to assume a longer term bank-borrower lending relationship with debtor countries.
See infra note 45 and accompanying text (IMF funds have become integral part of ongoing
LDC financings).
45. Cf. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (arguing that increase in IMF appropriations
by U.S. is essential so that IMF, in conjunction with commercial banks, can carry on its LDC
financing role).
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Early in the Senate Committee hearings on bank supervision,4 6 Senator
John Heinz, III, a sponsor of the original Senate Bill calling for international
lending supervision, 47 acknowledged that it would be difficult to justify to
both the Senate and the voting public an increase in the IMF contribution
unless the Senate Committee took measures to ensure that commercial lending
to LDCs would not prolong the current LDC debt crisis or cause other LDC
debt problems in the future.48 The American public presumably would have
little sympathy for bankers who brought default problems upon themselves
through aggressive lending practices and "herd mentality" behavior in
making loans to LDCs.49 Without accompanying legislation governing bank
foreign lending activities, an increase in the United States' commitment to
the IMF designed to shore up the world financial system might have appeared
to the American public as a taxpayer-funded bank bailout.50 The American
public also would have been inclined to believe that Congress was throwing
good money after bad by increasing American contributions to the IMF if
Congress had not imposed restrictions on the flow of capital from commercial
banks to the LDCs.51
46. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 1 (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs considered IMF quota and international lending supervision proposals).
47. See S. 502, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Senate Bill which later became Act)
[hereinafter cited as "Senate Bill"]. The co-sponsors of the Senate Bill were Senators William
Proxmire and John Heinz, IIJ, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance
and Monetary Policy. Id.
48. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 6. In addition to calling for international
lending supervision reform, Senator Heinz claimed that legislation, and not mere regulatory
reform, was necessary before a majority in the Senate would vote for an increase in the IMF
quota. Id. Senator Proxmire echoed Senator Heinz's claim that legislation was necessary. Id.
at 8. In their reports to the House and Senate, both the House and Senate Committees
investigating international lending supervision concluded that legislation was necessary to effect
permanent changes in the supervision process. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 13 (stating
necessity of permanent improvements in regulation of foreign lending); HousE REPORT, supra
note 25, 1920-21 (Congress would not be satisfied with federal banking agency assurances that
agencies will improve regulation of foreign lending practices).
49. See HousE REPORT, supra note 25, 1914. Banks have a tendency to behave in a "herd-
like fashion" by rushing into lending situations as a group without properly assessing long term
prospects for repayment. Id.; see also Soros, The Debt Crisis: Why System-Wide Reform Is
Critical, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at F2, col. 5 (commercial banks adopted aggressive
approach to foreign lending).
50. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Jake Garn
indicating concern that some people may view IMF quota increase as bank bailout, but claiming
that proposal is not bailout scheme); see also Mendez, supra note 31, at 180 n.56 (Reagan
administration and Congress are worried that increase in IMF quota would generate impression
of government-funded bank bailout). Although Senator Heinz argued that Congress might reject
the proposal to increase U.S. contributions to the IMF unless accompanied by legislation
governing domestic bank foreign lending practices, Heinz stressed that the bill concerning
lending supervision was not punitive in nature. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 6 (opening
statement of Senator John Heinz, III). Instead, the drafters of the Senate Bill intended the
draft legislation to ensure that another debt crisis would not occur. Id.
51. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 6 (opening statement of Senator John Heinz,
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Those favoring international lending supervision legislation might still
complain despite Congress' decision to accompany new IMF appropriations
with international banking legislation. Persons skeptical of Congress' good
faith in imposing restrictions on bank lending abroad could argue that
Congress merely sought an expedient scheme to gain popular approval for
increased United States participation in the IMF.5 2 Even assuming a good
faith congressional effort to reform bank foreign lending practices, critics
nonetheless might question legitimately the effectiveness of the resulting
legislation. 53 While the Act ultimately amounts to more than mere window
dressing for increased United States' contributions to the IMF, the Act did
not make full use of techniques available for regulating commercial lending
to LDCs.5 4 The differences between the Act and the original Senate Bill from
which the Act arose illustrate the Act's deficiencies.
5
The most striking difference between the Senate Bill and the subsequent
Act was that while the Bill sought to authorize the Fed to promulgate limits
on loans domestic banks could make to foreign countries, 6 the Act does not
prescribe any country lending limits.5 7 The Senate Bill's country lending limit
provision would have required the Fed to promulgate regulations setting the
maximum percentage of any single bank's capital which that bank could
lend to private and public borrowers in a particular foreign country.
58
Although the Fed's loan limit percentages would have been uniform for all
domestic banking institutions, the percentages would have varied for each
borrowing country based on the Fed's determination of the level of debt
that each country reasonably could service. 9 Proponents of the country loan
limit approach argued that limitations on the amount that any one bank
could lend to a given country would force banks to diversify their lending
III). Congress might not have passed the IMF quota increase if members of the Senate Committee
did not take steps to counter possible criticism that the IMF proposal meant "throwing good
money after bad." Id.
52. Cf. supra note 48 and accompanying text (Senator Heinz acknowledged that increased
IMF appropriations would be unpopular unless accompanied by commercial bank legislation).
53. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (criticizing Act for not encouraging
diversification of lenders to LDCs).
54. See infra note 102 (several major U.S. banks have made special provisions for loan
losses as result of Act's stringent regulatory requirements); infra notes 109-12 and accompanying
text (arguing that Congress did not pursue diversification of lending pool strategy for coping
with world debt problem); see also infra, note 60 and accompanying text (Act does not call for
country lending limits).
55. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (describing differences between Act and
Senate Bill).
56. See Senate Bill, supra note 47, at § 32 (section of Bill would have amended Federal
Reserve Act to authorize federal banking agencies to establish country lending limits).
57. See supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text (describing provisions of Act).
58. See Senate Bill, supra note 47, at § 32. The Senate Bill left the actual country lending
limit percentages to the discretion of the Federal Reserve Board. Id.
59. See id. § 32(b)(2). Under the Senate Bill, the Federal Reserve Board was to decide
what factors establish a borrowing country's creditworthiness. Id.
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portfolios. 6° Diversification of a bank's foreign assets in turn would help
ensure that a default by a particular foreign borrower would not result in
the collapse of a particular bank or group of banks since diversification*
would help spread the shock from default throughout the financial commu-
nity.
6'
Although the Senate Bill and the Act incorporated provisions for special
loan loss reserves, a considerable difference exists between the provisions as
proposed and as enacted.6 2 According to the Bill, the Fed would have required
special loan loss reserves whenever the Fed determined there was a substantial
likelihood that a foreign debtor would not repay a loan according to the
original terms of the loan agreement.63 Under the Senate Bill, the likelihood
of default or interruption of debt service payments by a foreign borrower,
the additional borrowing by the foreign borrower, or the major restructuring
of a foreign debtor's obligations would have triggered the reserve require-
ment.64 In contrast, the Act imposes reserve requirements only when an
60. See infra note 61 (discussing proposed diversification strategy under Senate Bill).
61. See Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 219-21 (discussing pre-Act statutory
lending limits). Prior to the Act, Congress authorized the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency to issue regulations limiting to 10% of a bank's capital the amount of credit the bank
could extend to a single domestic or foreign borrower. See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as 1976 Act]. In 1982, Congress raised the statutory limit to 15% of capital. See Garn-
St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 401, 96 Stat. 1469,
1508-10 (1982). Congress sought to diversify bank loan portfolios by imposing lending limits,
thereby reducing the effect a borrower's default would have on the financial health of the
borrower's bank creditors. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1310(b) (1982). Although the 1976 Act imposed
limits on the amount any one bank could lend to a particular entity within a foreign country,
including the foreign country's government, the 1976 Act did not limit the total amount a bank
could lend within a particular foreign country. Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7 at
222. The Senate Bill would have given the Federal Reserve Board the authority to establish
special lending limits for banks, expressed as a percentage of bank capital, governing aggregate
lending within a given country by a given bank. See Senate Bill, supra note 47, at 2. The special
country lending limits under the Senate Bill would have applied to all domestic banks in addition
to the 15% limit under the Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Id. The
Senate Bill recognized the economic interdependence among all borrowing entities within a
particular foreign country and the need to treat all such entities as a single borrower for
regulatory purposes. See id.; see Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 220 n.122 (LDC
government authorities often allocate limited available foreign exchange to repay government
debt first in time of economic crisis).
The most controversial aspect of the Senate Bill was that the Bill would have given the
Federal Reserve Board the authority to assess safe lending limits for each debtor nation based
upon the Board's credit analysis of each borrower country, a role traditionally left to the
commercial banks. See generally Wriston, Banking Against Disaster, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1983, at D3, col. I (defending banks' capacity to assess foreign lending risk and to lend
responsibly).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65 (discussing distinction between loan loss
reserve provisions under Senate Bill and under Act).
63. See Senate Bill, supra note 47, at § 33 (section of Bill concerning loan loss reserves).
The Bill ddes not specify what "substantial likelihood of default" actually means. See id.
64. See id. (Senate Bill in its original form would have authorized Federal Reserve Board
to require banks to establish loan loss reserves prior to actual interruption of debt repayment
or default on interest payments in some cases).
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actual and prolonged interruption in service on foreign debt has occurred or
when little hope exists for resumption of debt service.65
While members of the House and Senate Banking Committees argued
over the provisions of the Act, others questioned the need for legislation
concerning foreign lending supervision.66 For example, the Federal banking
agencies claimed that the existing regulatory framework was sufficient to
enable the agencies to curtail overly aggressive foreign lending practices.
67
The three principal banking regulatory agencies issued a Joint Memorandum
to the House and Senate Banking Committees setting out regulatory changes
the agencies could make, within the context of existing legislation, that would
tighten controls on international lending by domestic banks.68 The House
and Senate Banking Committees maintained, however, that legislation man-
dating the agencies' proposed regulatory reforms was necessary. 69 Moreover,
members of the Senate Committee argued that legislation would ensure that
65. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904(a)(1) (West Supp. 1984) (stating when banking agencies shall
require banks to establish special reserves). Factors indicating when a foreign asset is impaired
to the point of requiring a special reserve include a foreign borrower's failure to pay interest
on any foreign indebtedness, failure to meet terms of restructured indebtedness, and failure to
comply with an IMF or other adjustment program. The language of the Act suggests that the
banking agencies may require a particular lender to establish special reserves when a foreign
borrower fails to meet the terms of its indebtedness to any foreign lender, not merely
indebtedness to that particular lender. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904(a)(l) (West Supp. 1984).
. Another difference between the Senate Bill and the Act was that under the Bill, banks
were to account for special loan loss reserves by making a corresponding deduction from assets,
whereas under the Act banks are to deduct such reserves from current income. See Senate Bill,
supra note 47, at § 33 (accounting adjustment for creation of special reserves, under Senate
Bill); 12 U.S.C.A. § 3904(a)(2) (West Supp. 1984) (accounting adjustment for creation of special
reserves under Act). A deduction from current income of amounts for establishing special
reserves for foreign loan losses helps eliminate the appearance of financial well-being reflected
in improving bank earnings, when in fact the soundness of banks' foreign assets continues to
deteriorate. Cf. Rohatyn, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing that international loan roll-over fees create
dangerous illusion of sound banking system).
66. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 18 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, that existing authority of banking agencies to prevent unsafe and
unsound banking practices is sufficient to cope with international debt problem).
67. See HousE REPORT, supra note 25, 1918 (statement by Paul Volcker that existing
bank regulatory framework regarding international lending is constructive and sound).
68. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 24-25 (banking agencies' Joint Memorandum
incorporated as part of agency officials' statements). The Joint Memorandum set forth the
following five proposals for regulatory reform: (1) strengthening the existing program of country
risk examination and evaluation; (2) increasing the disclosure of banks' country loan exposure;
(3) establishing a system of special reserves on problem foreign loans; (4) spreading loan
rescheduling fees over the life of a foreign loan; and (5) improving international cooperation
with foreign bank regulators and with the IMF. Id. at 25. The five-part proposal in the Joint
Memorandum was remarkably similar in all but its details to the International Lending
Supervision Act. See supra note 14-41 and accompanying text (describing provisions of Act).
69. See House REPORT, supra note 25, at 1920-21 (past banking agency neglect of
international lending issue undermines agency assurances that legislation is unwarranted); see
also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 13 (Senate Banking Committee maintained that legislation
was necessary but agreed with Joint Memorandum's proposals for regulatory reform).
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the agencies' regulatory reforms would become permanent rather than subject
to repeal under future bank regulators.70 The House Committee, however,
was much more critical than was the Senate Committee concerning the
historical performance of the regulatory agencies in policing American
international banking activities!' The House Committee expressed suspicion
of the agencies' sincerity in proposing regulatory reforms, especially in light
of perceived agency neglect of international lending supervision.7 2 The House
Banking Committee also criticized the agencies' five-point proposa 7 3 as
overly general and short-sighted.7 4 Despite the House Committee's dim view
of the agencies' proposal, the International Lending Supervision Act essen-
tially set out in legislation what the banking agencies proposed to do as a
matter of regulation.
75
From the outset of congressional hearings into the need for international
lending supervision, representatives from the banking industry objected to
both new legislation and any proposed increase in agency regulation of
foreign lending by domestic banks.7 6 Bank representatives argued that action
70. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 7 (opening statement of William Proxmire).
Although Senator Proxmire praised the banking agency regulators for their recent efforts in
proposing regulatory reform, Proxmire maintained that legislation governing U.S. bank lending
abroad was necessary to ensure that future regulators would not permit a recurrence of an LDC
debt crisis. Id.
71. See HousE REPORT, supra note 25, 1920-21 (House Report accused banking agencies
of neglecting regulation of domestic banks' foreign lending practices).
72. See id. In its report, the House Banking Committee based its claim of banking agency
insincerity on the agencies' failure to change their regulatory methods despite charges and
evidence that the pre-Act regulatory system was inadequate, especially with respect to foreign
lending. Id. In 1977, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report following its
audit of the federal banking agencies' supervisory practices. Id. at 1915. The GAO criticized
the banking agencies for inconsistent practices, failure to adequately examine lending activities
of foreign branches of U.S. banks, and failure to require banks to adopt more stringent internal
controls. Id. at 1916. In 1979, the three federal banking agencies established an Interagency
Country Exposure Review Committee to assess debtor countries' ability to repay loans and
evaluate domestic banks' internal risk management programs concerning foreign loans. See
GOLEM E, supra note 14, at 75.
Although the creation of the Interagency Committee represented an attempt at greater
uniformity in regulation of foreign lending, commentators criticized the effectiveness of the
Interagency Committee in fulfilling its supervisory role, primarily because of the Committee's
limited power to control bank exposure to LDC default. See Regulation of Bank Lending,
supra note 7, at 218-19. The Interagency Committee's sanctioning powers are limited as a
practical matter to issuing non-binding comments to banks that have exceeded prudent foreign
lending standards. Id. Banks frequently ignore Interagency Committee comments. Id.
73. See supra note 68 (setting forth five-point proposal of Joint Memorandum).
74. See HousE REPORT, supra note 25, at 1920 (Joint Memorandum of federal banking
agencies did not set out specific reforms and addressed only short-term problems of international
debt crisis).
75. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (House was critical of banking agency
proposals in Joint Memorandum).
76. See HousE REPORT, supra note 25, at 1921 (representatives from Bank of America,
Chase Manhattan Bank and Citibank testified in February 1983 that additional legislation or
regulations concerning bank lending abroad were unnecessary).
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by legislators restricting the credit available to debtor nations by discouraging
commercial lending would be detrimental to the world financial system.
7
7
Moreover, the bank representatives argued that new foreign lending regula-
tions would frustrate the attempts of LDCs to meet their capital needs at a
time when balance of payment problems and economic development objec-
tives made infusions of fresh capital necessary. 78 Bank representatives claimed
that regulatory or legislative action imposing economic disincentives to
commercial bank lending abroad could cause a severe contraction of credit
available to LDCs. 79 Like the banking regulators, bankers opposed country
lending limits and maintained that country risk analysis 0 performed by the
commercial banks would protect banks from dangerously high levels of
foreign loan default exposure. 8' The attitude of the banking industry was
that although LDCs faced short-term liquidity problems, LDCs were not
insolvent in the traditional sense.82 Bankers believed that the loans on which
debtor LDCs had stopped payment should not be considered in default since
77. See Senate Hearing, supra note 31, at 116 (letter from George J. Clark, Executive
Vice President, Citibank, N.A., in answer to questions from Senator William Proxmire
concerning federal regulation of international lending activities of domestic banks). George
Clark related Citibank's position that Congress and the banking agencies should not promulgate
regulations which would cause banks to curtail vital lending to LDCs. Id. Clark also stated that
bank regulators were justified in hesitating to classify loans as "lost" loans when countries
failed to meet repayment schedules since countries could regain the ability to resume payments
by making appropriate domestic economic adjustments. Id.
78. See supra note 77 (describing reaction of bank representatives to prospect of additional
banking regulations).
79. See id. (regulations governing international lending might discourage domestic banks
from lending abroad).
80. See Dale, Country Risk and Bank Regulation, BANKER, March 1983, at 41. Country
risk is a lending bank's risk that a government borrower will be unwilling or unable to meet its
debt obligations, or that a private borrower abroad will be unable to meet its debt obligations
as a result of local foreign exchange restrictions. Id. See generally Walter, Country Risk and
International Bank Lending, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 71, 71-88 (1982) (describing factors which
banks consider in assessing country risk associated with lending to private or public borrower
in foreign country).
81. Cf. Wriston Interview, supra note 6, at 253. (Walter Wriston, Chairman of Citicorp,
claimed that it is up to banks, and not Congress, to allocate available credit among foreign
borrowers).
82. See International Financial Markets and Related Problems: Hearings Before the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. 182 (1983). William S. Ogden, Vice Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., testified that debtor LDCs faced a short term liquidity problem, and not a permanent
solvency problem. Id. Ogden claimed that a world-wide economic recovery would permit LDCs
to resume debt service. Id. William H. Bolin, Vice Chairman of Bank of America, N.T. and
S.A., agreed with Ogden, arguing that debtor countries were not bankrupt in the sense that a
business enterprise might be bankrupt. Id. at 235. Ogden referred to Argentina as a classic
example of a country facing a liquidity problem. Id. at 302. According to Ogden, Argentina
soon would post a trade surplus, but required interim debt relief. Id.
Insolvency problems are theoretically distinguishable from liquidity problems. Regulation
of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 206 n.32. Debtor nations' total liabilities do not exceed their
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LDCs eventually would overcome liquidity problems and would resume
payments."
Since the enactment of the International Lending Supervision Act, the
federal banking agencies have promulgated international banking require-
ments pursuant to the Act. The Fed, in conjunction with the FDIC and the
COC, issued a series of regulations which govern reserves against potential
foreign loan losses, establish international loan fee accounting conventions,
and require the disclosure and reporting of international assets . 5 The' new
regulations identify the reserves that banks must establish against potential
losses on foreign loans as "Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves" ("ATRRs").1
6
The regulations specify that ATRRs shall represent ten percent of the
total assets, as would be the case in a traditional example of insolvency. Id. As a practical
matter, however, the residual value of sovereign assets over liabilities should be of very little
comfort to lenders since foreign governments would be most unlikely to liquidate assets to
satisfy their loan obligations. Id. Moreover, mechanisms do not exist by which banks can
compel foreign governments to liquidate national assets to service international debt. Cf. The
Debt-Bomb Threat, Tim, Jan. 10, 1983, at 50 (commercial banks can "hardly send gunboats"
to seize assets in debtor countries). Additionally, foreign government claims of sovereign
immunity might hinder the banks' ability to collect amounts due on foreign government loans.
Id.
83. Cf. Wriston Interview, supra note 6, at 252. Walter Wriston argues that default by a
foreign country borrower on its commercial debt would prove too costly to the borrower, since
that debtor nation would thereby alienate itself from world capital markets and would find it
very difficult, if not impossible, to borrow again in the future. Id. Felix Rohatyn, however,
warns that a debtor country might repudiate its foreign debt obligations following a radical
change in government. See Rohatyn, supra note 3, at 6 (LDC debt repudiation is possible
despite likelihood of alienating capital markets).
84. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (describing regulations banking agencies
have adopted pursuant to Act).
85. See Subpart D-International Lending Supervision, I FED. REsERvE REGULATORY
SERvicE (FED. REsERvE BOARD) 3-656 to 3-668 (May, 1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
211.41-.45) [hereinafter cited as Subpart D]. The Fed issued the new Subpart D under Regulation
K which governs international banking operations. See 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1965). The new Subpart
D provides for the creation of new reserves, the reporting and disclosure of international bank
assets, and the adoption of new accounting treatment for fees which banks earn on international
loans. Subpart D, supra, at 3-656 to 3-668. Subpart D does not treat the capital requirement
provision of the Act. See id. As of October 1984, however, the FDIC was contemplating
gradually raising bank capital requirements to 9% of assets from the current 5.5% level. FDIC
Soft-Pedals Bank-Discipline Plans, Mulls Raising Capital Requirements to 9%, WAL ST. J.,
Oct. 2, 1984, at 7, Col. 1. Neither the Fed nor the COC have agreed to the 9% level, but
instead have discussed setting a 6% level. Id. All three banking agencies must agree on a single
capital-to-assets ratio before a new standard will become effective. Id.
86. See Subpart D, supra note 85, at 3-658. The Fed defined "transfer risk" as the risk
to a lending institution that a public or private borrower in a foreign country would be unable
to service its debt in the currency of payment because of insufficient foreign exchange in the
obligor's country. Id. at 3-657.2. During a time of fiscal crisis, for example, a foreign government
might allocate all available foreign exchange to meet the country's public sector debt, thereby
leaving nothing with which private borrowers within the country could pay their foreign debt
obligations. See Dale, Country Risk and Bank Regulation, BANKER, March 1983, at 43 (private
sector borrowers in financially troubled countries are likely to be last in queue for scarce foreign
exchange, citing recent examples of Mexico and Argentina).
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principal amount of each international asset for the initial year and fifteen
percent in subsequent years unless the federal banking agencies jointly
determine otherwise on a case-by-case basis.8 7 Furthermore, the new regula-
tions list the factors that the federal banking agencies will consider in
determining the amount of the ATRR required for each international asset.8"
Despite the House Committee's reprimand for the banking agencies' apparent
lack of concern about foreign lending practices, the federal banking agencies
managed to preserve a great deal of flexibility in regulating international
lending practices. 9
The ultimate value of the Act, beyond that of political expediency in
facilitating increased contributions to the IMF, 90 depends in part on the
degree to which follow-up regulations and enforcement will prohibit a
business-as-usual attitude among bank regulators and bank management. 9'
To promote a lasting solution to the international debt crisis, agency regu-
latory measures adopted under the Act must help reduce the current high
level of LDC default exposure of domestic money-center banks and ensure
that banks do not exceed prudent levels of foreign default exposure in the
future. 92 The regulations, however, must not cause an LDC credit squeeze
so severe as to set back indefinitely LDC economic recovery.93
Throughout the debate over the need for international lending reform,
a dominant legislative concern has been striking an appropriate balance
between reducing domestic bank exposure to potential LDC default and
avoiding an acute undersupply of credit to LDCs, a situation which could
trigger the very risk of LDC default that Congress has sought to protect
against.9 4 For example, reckless bank lending to debtor nations would cause
87. See Subpart D, supra note 85, at 3-659 (specifying reserve amounts banking agencies
shall require banks to establish against losses on foreign loans).
88. Id. The Fed stated that in determining a foreign loan loss reserve amount, the banking
agencies would consider the length of time a bank's foreign assets were impaired, the actions
the debtor took to restore debt service, the prospects for restoring asset quality and other
factors the banking agencies deem relevant. Id.
89. Cf. supra text accompanying note 75 (Congress transformed banking agency recom-
mendations in Joint Memorandum into legislation with few changes).
90. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (public might view Act as widow-dressing
for IMF appropriations bill).
91. Cf. Rohatyn, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that Congress should not adopt policy of
allowing banks and LDC debtors to muddle through debt crisis, given risk of general financial
collapse from such policy).
92. See infra note 100 (bank regulations must strike balance between excessive LDC
lending and causing LDC credit squeeze).
93. See infra note 94 (abrupt credit squeeze could increase liquidity problems for LDC
borrowers).
94. See, e.g., Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 232 (arguing that proposal
involving insurance of foreign debt would reduce bank default exposure and help stem reduction
of capital available to LDCs); Rohatyn, supra note 3, at 7 (expressing concern that dramatic
contraction of credit available to LDCs is occurring as money-center banks seek to reduce
exposure to LDC default on foreign loans); Senator John Heinz Discusses the Current World
Debt, TR. & EST., Nov. 1983, at 7 (Senator John Heinz indicates that while volume of bank
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further deterioration in the quality of a commercial bank's asset portfolio. 95
A deterioration in a bank's loan portfolio might cause a run on the bank's
deposits,9 6 or lead to bank insolvency should some of the larger debtor
nations default on their massive borrowings. 97 On the other hand, a severe
cutback in credit available to debtor nations could cause financial havoc by
forcing debtor nations into default on foreign debt. 98 Although providing
additional credit to finance LDC trade deficits and interest due on existing
debt is not a sound long-term financing arrangement, the continued availa-
bility of credit for LDCs in the short-run may be essential to forestall LDC
foreign loan defaults. 99 The effectiveness of the Act in promoting greater
lending to LDCs must decline over time, current danger is that abrupt cutoff of credit to LDCs
would exacerbate liquidity crisis among LDCs); see also Cline, The Issue Is Illiquidity, Not
Insolvency, CHALLENGE, July-Aug., 1984, at 12. New bank lending to LDCs dropped from
approximately $50 billion in 1981 to $25 billion in 1982 and to slightly less than $25 billion for
1983. Id. at 19. Continued lending by private banks is essential in light of projected LDC new
capital requirements of between $75 billion and $80 billion through 1986. Id.
95. Cf. supra note 6 and accompanying text (commercial banks engaged in excessive
lending to LDCs face risk of financial collapse should LDCs default on foreign loans).
96. See Greenspan Warning on Loans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at D2, col. 1. Alan
Greenspan, member of the Presidential Council of Economic Advisors under the Nixon and
Ford administrations, warned that depositor concern over the international debt situation might
result in runs on deposits from banks engaged in lending to LDCs. Id. The FDIC insures bank
depositors for up to $100,000 per depositor. See GOLEmBE, supra note 14, at 48. Although 95%
of the deposit accounts in the United States are fully insured, the FDIC estimated that in 1982
only 20% of the accounts in large money-center banks were fully insured because of the large
size of most accounts. Central Banking Survey, EcoNoMIsT, Sept. 22, 1984, at 44. The FDIC
insurance scheme, therefore, does not fully protect a large amount of deposits on the books of
the principal LDC lenders. See id. Depositor uncertainty about the health of a bank's asset
portfolio could cause a run on even fully insured deposits given the prospect of delay in FDIC
settlement of depositor claims and associated inconvenience in the event of a bank failure. Id.
at 41.
97. See Top Banks' Third World Loans Detailed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1983, at D3, col.
1. The capital of U.S. multinational banks is not sufficient to cover a write-off of even a
portion of their foreign loan exposure. Id.; see supra note 8 (LDC loans expressed as percentage
of bank equity). The Fed is unwilling to promote the notion that the Fed would act as lender
of last resort in the event of a banking crisis. Cf. Central Banking Survey, ECONOinST, Sept.
22, 1984, at 32 (central banks reluctant to reassure incompetent bankers). By remaining
ambiguous as to its potential role as lender of last resort, the Fed hopes to encourage prudent
lending practices among banks. Id. As a practical matter, however, the Fed likely would not
allow a major bank to fail, given the impact such a failure would have on the entire banking
system. Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 224. The response of the banking agencies
to the near collapse of the Continental Illinois Bank tends to indicate that they will not allow
a major bank to fail. Cf. Central Banking Survey, EcoNoMNsT, Sept. 22, 1984, at 44 (FDIC
fully guaranteed all deposits at Continental Illinois and waived FDIC's $100,000 limit in
unsuccessful attempt to prevent run on deposits). Critics of the Fed's policy of refusing to
publicly declare itself a lender of last resort argue that such a policy injects further uncertainty
into the already volatile environment of international lending. Regulation of Bank Lending,
supra note 7, at 223-24.
98. See supra note 94 (contraction of credit available to LDCs could cause liquidity
problems for LDCs).
99. See Senator John Heinz Discusses the Current World Debt, TR. & EsT., Nov. 1983,
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stability in the world financial system will depend to a large extent on
whether the Act and subsequent regulations can protect against the twin
perils of LDC credit undersupply and bank overexposure.' °0
The special loan loss reserve requirements under the Act and the ATRR
requirements under the regulations provide a significant economic deterrent
to continued LDC lending by domestic banks as banks must deduct new
reserve amounts from their earnings. 101 Since the passage of the Act, the
major domestic banks have raised their loan loss reserves in response to
pressure from federal banking agency examiners. 102 Increasing loan loss
reserves has reduced earnings for United States based multinational banks. 03
Faced with both the prospect of lower earnings because of strict reserve
requirements and the realization that debtor LDCs may remain unable to
pay at least some of their foreign debt obligations indefinitely,' °4 domestic
at 7 (Senator John Heinz arguing that abrupt cutback in LDC lending could cause financial
turmoil).
100. See Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 208 (bankers and bank regulators
must strike balance between competing goals of bank soundness and continued availability of
credit to LDCs); To Amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to Authorize Consent to an
Increase in the United States Quota in the International Monetary Fund (H.R. 5970): Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House
Committee on Banking ,Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 394 (1980) (testimony
of Henry Wallich, member of Board of Governors of Federal Reserve, indicating that solution
to debt situation must neither involve excessive lending nor produce sharp curtailment of
lending).
101. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (Act requires banks to charge special loan
loss reserves against current income). Had the nine largest U.S. money center banks established
loan loss reserves representing 10% of the nine banks' loans to the six most indebted LDCs-
Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, the Philippines, and Chile-the nine banks would have
suffered an average 90% reduction in actual earnings per share for 1983. See News Release,
The Wachovia Corporation, Oct. 10, 1984, at 2 ("Hypothetical Earnings Reductions from
Setting Up Loss Reserves on Loans to Big-6 LDCs").
102. See Major Banks Avoid Big Loan Write-Offs But Sharply Boost Their Loss Reserves,
Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1984, at 7, col. 1. According to third quarter earnings reports for 1983,
bankers at Security Pacific Corp. increased loan loss reserves by 42%, or $155 million, and
bankers at Manufacturers Hanover Corp. and Chase Manhattan Corp. increased loan loss
reserves by $30 million and $50 million respectively. Id. A banking industry analyst at Smith,
Barney, Harris, Upham & Co. attributed the increase in loan loss reserves at the major U.S.
banks to the banks' "cushioning" against anticipated problems in the Latin American debt
situation. Id. The Comptroller of the Currency, however, required First Chicago Corp. to write
off $279 million in both foreign and domestic problem loans, a more radical step than requiring
an increase in loan loss reserves. Id. An anonymous bank officer attributed the tougher
regulatory environment to the near collapse of Continental Illinois Corporation earlier in 1983.
Id.
103. See Behind the Banking Turmoil, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 29, 1984, at 101 (Citicorp reported
a 9.5% decline in third quarter earnings instead of flat earnings for that period because bank
added $26 million to its loan loss reserves).
104. Cf. Citicorp Insures Against Losses on Some Loans: Lendings in Five Countries are
Protected in a Policy Valued at $900 Million, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1984, at 4, col. 1. Citicorp
purchased $900 million in insurance coverage to protect against possible losses on loans to
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Philippines. Id. Citicorp had loans totalling
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banks will cut back significantly on their foreign lending activity. 0 5 Although
one of the goals of the Act is to safeguard the banking system by curbing
aggressive lending to LDCs, 1' 6 the Act may tend to destabilize the world
banking system and therefore the soundness of domestic banks by exacer-
bating the current LDC credit squeeze. 07 The Act is open to criticism on the
ground that Congress failed to enact legislation that both promotes sound
banking practices and ensures an adequate supply of capital for LDCs. 08
While the goals of restricting bank exposure to possible LDC default
and ensuring an adequate supply of capital to LDCs appear to be in conflict,
the legislature and bank regulators could have harmonized these goals by
seeking to expand the pool of LDC lenders. 1 09 Measures encouraging financial
institutions not currently involved in lending abroad to enter the international
lending market on a modest scale would help ensure the availability of funds
that LDCs require to avoid serious liquidity problems." 0 The entrance of
new financial institutions into the international lending market also would
enable the money center banks to reduce their high levels of foreign exposure
without thereby terminating LDC access to American capital markets.",
Spreading LDC default risk among many financial institutions would reduce
the threat of systemic collapse of the world financial system since no major
roughly $12 billion in the five LDCs as of year-end 1983. Id. While Citicorp is the first banking
institution to have purchased such an insurance policy, the company's action is indicative of a
less optimistic attitude among bankers towards the prospect of repayment of their loans to
LDCs. Id. Citicorp's action is especially significant given the bank's earlier insistance that the
LDC debt situation is a short-term problem. Id. It is not yet clear how the federal banking
agencies will react to Citibank's insurance scheme.
105. Cf. Rohatyn, supra note 3, at 7. Even before Congress passed the Act, U.S. banks
had cut back the flow of fund to LDCs. Id.
106. See supra text accompanying note 8 (Congress in enacting foreign lending legislation
sought to promote sound banking practices).
107. See Rohatyn, supra note 3, at 7 (arguing that dramatic contraction of credit available
to LDCs is taking place and that LDC credit squeeze poses threat to world financial system).
108. See infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text (diversification of lending pool would
lower individual bank's exposure to LDC default and provide LDCs with needed funds).
109. See Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 208 (regulatory policy must seek to
harmonize apparently competing goals of limiting bank exposure to LDC default and making
capital available to LDCs); see also id. at 210-12 (arguing that danger of systemic collapse of
financial system would decrease by spreading risk of default through diversification of lenders
to LDCs).
110. See supra note 94 (contraction of credit available to LDCs could cause liquidity
problems for LDCs); cf. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 1, at 837 (criticizing proposals for
resolving world debt problem which do not provide for new funds for LDCs).
111. Cf. Mendez, supra note 31, at 183-85. The large money-center banks could achieve
actual reductions in their LDC default exposure through syndications and sub-participations of
loans to LDCs. Id. at 183. In a syndication, a managing bank divides a loan among several
participating banks. Id. at 184. In a sub-participation, a bank sells part of a loan in its portfolio
to one or more other banks in exchange for the right to receive the proceeds from the loan. Id.
184. Both of these techniques help banks to diversify their loan portfolios. Id. at 184. Congress
should take steps to encourage the use of these techniques to involve non-money-center banks
in the LDC lending process. See infra text accompanying note 115 (discussing way in which
Congress could broaden LDC lending pool).
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bank or group of banks would face the risk of failure should LDCs default
on their debt obligations.
12
The very factors in the Act which dissuade current international lenders
from increasing their foreign exposure also tend to discourage new partici-
pants from entering the foreign lending process. 1 3 While Congress and the
regulatory agencies cannot compel financial institutions to participate in
lending to LDCs, Congress and the agencies could make lending abroad
more attractive to institutions which currently have little or no foreign
exposure. 14 A federal program insuring all or part of new foreign loans, for
instance, might encourage domestic lending institutions to enter the interna-
tional lending markets."- Banks participating in the insurance program might
pay premiums to the government agency administering the program, just as
FDIC member banks pay premiums to the FDIC for deposit insurance.1 6 In
addition, Congress could make insurance of bank LDC lending conditional
upon a bank's coordinating its foreign lending activity with the IMF or a
similar organization to ensure that banks lacking experience in lending abroad
do not lend imprudently.' "
The International Lending Supervision Act indicates congressional con-
cern for the health of the United States banking system in light of the LDC
112. See Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 211-12 (risk of systemic collapse of
financial system would decrease if banks would spread LDC default exposure more evenly
throughout financial system).
113. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (loan loss reserve requirements which
banking agencies promulgated pursuant to Act will discourage further lending abroad by U.S.
banks). Since the new loan loss reserve requirements apply to all U.S. banks, banks already
involved in LDC markets and banks not yet involved in LDC lending will be reluctant to extend
credit abroad. Cf. supra note 21 and accompanying text (banks are to charge special loan loss
reserves for foreign loans against current income).
114. See Fed Push on Foreign Loans Seen, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1983, at 29, col. 6 (federal
bank regulatory agencies have no legal power to compel banks to lend abroad). Despite the
banking agencies' lack of legal authority to compel banks to lend abroad, the agencies have
put pressure on banks to extend new credit to LDCs. Id.; cf. Regulation of Bank Lending,
supra note 7, at 209 (President Reagan and Treasury Secretary Regan have urged U.S. banks
to continue lending to Brazil).
115. See Regulation of Bank Lending, supra note 7, at 228-32 (discussing possible federal
default insurance on loans to LDCs).
116. See id. at 229-30 (comparing possible federal insurance for LDC lending with FDIC
insurance of deposits).
Congress could combine an LDC lending insurance program with country lending limits,
as contemplated in the original Senate Bill, to diversify both the asset portfolios of individual
banks and the pool of lenders to LDCs. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing
provision for country lending limits in Senate Bill). See generally Regulation of Bank Lending,
supra note 7, at 232-33 (discussing effect of adopting country lending limits and program to
increase LDC loans).
117. Cf. Dale, Country Risk and Bank Regulation, BANKExR, March 1983, at 48. Richard
S. Dale argues that the IMF should make known information on LDC debt levels and propose
guidelines for lending to LDCs as the basis for coordinating commercial lending to LDCs. Id.
Congress and the federal banking regulatory agencies might incorporate IMF coordination of
bank lending to LDCs within a possible federal LDC lending insurance program.
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debt problem."" In the long run, the Act likely will discourage banks from
over-lending to LDCs and improve the financial soundness of banks by
increasing capital adequacy ratios and foreign loss reserves." 9 Absent com-
panion legislation expanding the pool of LDC lenders and protecting against
a sudden contraction of credit available to LDCs, however, the Act may
actually destabilize the domestic financial system in the short-run by pushing
LDCs closer to default on their foreign borrowings. 2' While the Act has
prevented domestic commercial banks and the federal banking regulatory
agencies from maintaining a business-as-usual attitude toward LDC lend-
ing,' 2' the Act may succeed in substituting one source of financial malaise
for another.1'2 Sound economics require a gradual reduction in total lending
to LDCs.'2 The International Lending Supervision Act's weakness is that it
does not promote diversification of the pool of lenders to LDCs.124 Steps
toward spreading the risk of LDC default among a greater number of lending
institutions would be consistent with a strategy of insulating financial markets
from a possible LDC default shock wave. 25
K. NiCHOLAS MARTITSCH
118. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (Congress intended Act to promote sound
banking practices among U.S. banks lending abroad).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13 (summarizing provisions of Act).
120. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (Act may exacerbate current LDC credit
squeeze).
121. See supra text accompanying note 105 (Act likely to cause banks to cut back
significantly in their foreign lending activity). See generally supra note 91 (success of Act
depends partly on whether it prohibits business-as-usual attitude toward LDC lending).
122. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (while Act will curb aggressive foreign
lending by U.S. banks, Act may exacerbate current LDC credit squeeze).
123. Cf. supra note 5 and accompanying text (LDCs have contracted enormous debt
obligations).
124. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (legislation should encourage financial
institutions not yet involved in LDC lending to enter LDC lending market).
125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (spreading LDC default risk would help
protect world financial markets).
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